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A large number of households simultaneously have a signiﬁcant amount of credit card debt and a
signiﬁcant amount of low-interest liquid assets, such as money in their checking accounts. There
are many ways to measure this, and we discuss some of the empirical issues in more detail in
Section 4.2, but for now we oﬀer these simple summary statistics from Telyukova (2006): 27% of
U.S. households in 2001 had credit card debt and liquid assets both in excess of $500; and the
median household in this group revolved around $3,800 on their credit cards even though they
had $3,000 in the bank. The so-called credit card debt puzzle is this: given 14% interest rates
on credit cards, and 1 or 2% on bank accounts, why not pay down debt? According to Gross
and Souleles (2001), “Such behavior is puzzling, apparently inconsistent with no-arbitrage and
thus inconsistent with any conventional model.”
Some economists have gone to elaborate lengths recently to explain such phenomena. For
example, some assume that consumers cannot control themselves (Laibson et al. 2000); others
assume that they cannot control their spouses (Bertaut and Haliassos 2002; Haliassos and Reiter
2003); and others hypothesize that such households are typically on the verge of bankruptcy
(Lehnert and Maki 2001). These ideas are certainly interesting, may contain elements of truth,
and will be discussed further below, but from the outset we want to point out that the credit
card debt puzzle is actually not a new observation. Rather, it is another manifestation of the
venerable rate of return dominance puzzle from monetary economics. Hence, insights may be
gained by using models and ideas from monetary theory, and in particular, by taking seriously
the notion of liquidity.1
1The idea that agents may hold assets with low rates of return because they are relatively liquid – i.e. because
they have an advantage as a medium of exchange – is formalized among other places in Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), but goes back much further in the informal literature. None of this is to say that the credit card debt
puzzle is easy to explain by recasting it in terms of rate of return dominance, which is an old and diﬃcult issue;
what we are saying is that it is useful to think about consumer debt through the lens of modern monetary
economics.
2Our hypothesis is simply that households need to have money readily available – whether
this means cash on hand, or in the bank, or generally in the form of some relatively liquid assets
– for contingencies where it may be diﬃcult or costly to use credit. In addition to the usual
examples like taxis and cigarettes, it is important to note that there are many big-ticket items
for which this is the case. For instance, rent or mortgage payments cannot usually be made
by credit card. Also, for whatever reason, many unanticipated household expenses including
automotive or home repairs (heating and air conditioning, plumbing, etc.) cannot be covered
using credit. It can also be diﬃcult to pay for some medical emergencies with a credit card.
Clearly, getting caught short in such events can be very costly, and so even if these contingencies
are not all that frequent, agents may want to keep some money easily accessible, even if they
are revolving relatively high-interest credit card debt.
The rate of return dominance question and the idea that some notion of liquidity ought to
be part of the solution go back a long time. Hicks (1935) challenged monetary economists to
“look frictions in the face” when framing “the central issue in the pure theory of money” as the
need for an explanation of the fact that people hold money when interest rates are positive. The
better-known version of his challenge is to explain “the decision to hold assets in the form of
barren money, rather than of interest- or proﬁt-yielding securities.” But the same issue arises in
reverse: “So long as interest rates are positive, the decision to hold money rather than lend it,
or use it to pay oﬀ old debts, is apparently an unproﬁtable one” (Hicks 1935, emphasis added).
This looks a lot like the credit card debt puzzle.
This paper is about using recent developments in monetary economics to address the issue.
Unfortunately, for our purposes, there is no oﬀ-the-shelf model with money and credit, and
it is not trivial to build one. Modern theory makes money essential by imposing some form
of anonymity, which makes credit infeasible – indeed, making credit diﬃcult is precisely what
3makes money essential. Here we assume agents are anonymous in some situations but not others.
While this seems natural, one has to specify the environment in such a way that when agents
are not anonymous credit is actually useful, which is not the case e.g. in Lagos and Wright
(2005) because of quasi-linear utility in the centralized market of that model. Moreover, if one
does specify assumptions that make credit useful when agents are not anonymous, without care,
the analysis quickly becomes intractable, as is the case e.g. if one abandons quasi-linear utility
in the Lagos-Wright model. In our framework, money is essential and credit is useful, but the
analysis is still simple and yields strong existence and characterization results. These results
help us to understand the coexistence of consumer debt and low-interest liquid assets.2
2 The Basic Model
Here we describe the physical environment, focusing for now on a somewhat special case to
make the main point, then generalizing the results on several dimensions in Section 4 below.
To begin, there is a [0,1] continuum of agents that live forever in discrete time. There is one
nonstorable consumption good at each date that individuals produce using labor. Following
Lagos and Wright (2005), hereafter LW, we assume agents periodically visit both centralized
markets and decentralized markets. Having some decentralized trade, with certain frictions
discussed below, makes money essential. Having some centralized trade is interesting for its
own sake, and makes the analysis much more tractable than what one sees in models on the
microfoundations of money without this feature.3
2While this is a theory paper, Telyukova (2006) analyzes in detail how a version of the approach presented
here can account for salient aspects of the data quantitatively. We discuss this and some other empirical issues,
such as discriminating between alternative hypotheses, in Section 4.2.
3See Molico (2006), Green and Zhou (1998,2002), Camera and Corbae (1999), Zhou (1999) or Zhu (2003,2005)
for models where all trade is decentralized. Earlier monetary models like Shi (1995) or Trejos and Wright (1995)
are tractable, but only because of the assumption that money is indivisible and agents can carry at most 1 unit.
Shi (1996) is a previous search model with money and credit, but he also makes strong assumptions about how
much money and credit agents can carry (although, to his credit, he enforces repayment via collateral, while we
simply assume repayment).
4Money in this economy is a perfectly divisible and storable object that is intrinsically worth-
less but potentially could have value as a medium of exchange. The money supply is ﬁxed for
now at M, but later we allow it to vary over time. Although we use the word money, we do
not necessarily literally mean cash. It is not hard to recast the model with agents depositing
their cash in bank accounts and paying for goods and services using checks or debit cards, as in
He, Huang and Wright (2005,2006). This is relevant because what we have in mind is relatively
liquid assets generally: the money need not be in your pocket, and could be in your bank, but
it does need to be easily accessible. Given realistic interest rates on demand deposits, money in
the bank is about the same as money in your pocket (except possibly for safety considerations),
so we ignore the distinction and assume money here is any perfectly liquid asset with 0 interest.4
In LW, each period is divided into two subperiods. In one, there is a centralized Walrasian
market, and in the other, there is a decentralized market where agents meet according to a
random bilateral-matching process. With the additional assumption that agents are anonymous
in the decentralized market, a medium of exchange becomes essential, as is well known; see
Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001), Corbae et al. (2003), and Aliprantis et al. (2006) for
formal discussions. After each meeting of the decentralized market agents go to a centralized
market, where they engage in various activities, including working and rebalancing their money
holdings. If utility is linear in some variable, such as hours worked, all agents take the same
amount of money out of the centralized market, which keeps things nice and easy.
There is no role for credit in LW, and it is important to understand why. First, credit is
not possible in the decentralized market because of the assumption that agents are anonymous,
which we cannot relax since this is what makes money essential. Second, credit is not necessary
in the centralized market because of the assumption that all agents can work and have utility
4Later, in Section 4.1, we introduce an additional real asset that can always be liquidated but only at a ﬁxed
cost, and determine its return endogenously.
5that is linear in hours, which we do not want to relax since this is what makes the analysis
tractable. How to proceed? Our idea is to introduce a third subperiod – generalized later
to many subperiods – where some agents want to consume but cannot produce, which makes
credit useful, and where we do not assume anonymity, which makes credit feasible. We determine
whether agents use cash or credit in this market endogenously, while maintaining an essential
role for money plus analytic tractability due to the other two markets.5
All agents want to consume in subperiod (market) 1, and u1(x1) is their common utility
function, which is strictly increasing and weakly concave. A random subset want to consume
in s = 2,3, and conditional on this, us(xs) is their utility function, which is strictly increasing
and concave. All agents are able to produce in s = 1, and the disutility of working h1 hours is
linear, c1(h1) = h1. A random subset are able to produce in s = 2,3, and conditional on this,
the disutility of working is cs(hs), which is strictly increasing and weakly convex. When they
can produce, agents transform labor one-for-one into goods, xs = hs (it is easy to replace this
assumption by a standard labor market with ﬁrms having general technologies). At any s = 2,3
a random set of agents chosen in an i.i.d. manner want to consume but cannot produce, and






and let βs be the discount factor between s and the next subperiod, with β1β2β3 < 1.
An individual’s state is (mst,bst), denoting money and debt in subperiod s of period t. We
drop the t when there is no risk of confusion, writing mst = ms, ms,t+1 = ms,+1, etc. Let
Ws(ms,bs) be the value function. At s = 1,2, the market value of money is φs, so 1/φs is the
nominal price level; there is no φ3 since there is no centralized market at s = 3, although prices
will implicitly be deﬁned by whatever trades happen to occur. Similarly, the real interest rate
5Berentsen et al. (2005) and Chiu and Meh (2006) also introduce a subperiod where agents are not anonymous
into LW, so that credit is feasible. We share this approach of making all agents anonymous in some markets but
not others – as opposed to, say, Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,b) who assume some agents are anonymous in all
markets and some are not anonymous in any market.
6in the centralized market at s = 1,2 is rs, but there is no r3. Our convention for notation
is as follows: if you bring debt bs into subperiod s you owe (1 + rs)bs. We assume away all
enforcement problems with credit – repayment is assumed exogenously. It may be interesting to
make enforcement endogenous, but this would seem to be a distraction for our purposes. Still, it
is important to emphasize that this exogenous enforcement does not render money inessential:
the assumption is that we can enforce agreements when the agents are known (in centralized
markets) but not when they are anonymous (in decentralized markets).
We now consider behavior each subperiod (or, each market) in turn, after which we shall
put things together and talk about equilibrium.
2.1 Market 1
At s = 1, there is a centralized market where agents solve6
W1(m1,b1) = max
x1,h1,m2,b2
{u1(x1) − h1 + β1W2(m2,b2)} (1)
s.t. x1 = h1 + φ1(m1 − m2) − (1 + r1)b1 + b2.
Substituting h1 from the budget constraint, the ﬁrst-order conditions are
1 = u′
1(x1) (2)
φ1 = β1W2m(m2,b2) (3)
−1 = β1W2b(m2,b2). (4)
where e.g. Wsm is the partial of Ws with respect to m. The envelope conditions are
W1m(m1,b1) = φ1 (5)
W1b(m1,b1) = −(1 + r1). (6)
6To rule out Ponzi schemes, one normally imposes a credit limit bj ≤ ¯ B, either explicitly or implicitly. We
impose that agents pay oﬀ past debts at s = 1 each period, without loss in generality (given they have to pay
oﬀ debt at some point, they are quite happy to pay it oﬀ in market s = 1 at any date t since then they have
quasi-linear utility). Also, we always assume an interior solution for h; see LW for conditions to guarantee this is
valid in these types of models.
7Notice (2) implies x1 = x∗
1 for all agents, while (3)-(4) imply (m2,b2) is independent of x1
and (m1,b1). Also, as long as W2 is strictly concave, there will be a unique solution for (m1,b1).
It is simple to check that the same conditions that guarantee strict concavity in m from LW also
apply here, and so m2 = M for all agents. However, we will see that W2 is actually linear in b2,
which means we cannot pin down b2 for any individual. This is no surprise: with a competitive
market and quasi-linear utility, in equilibrium, agents are indiﬀerent between the allocation they
have and an alternative where they work a little more now, save the proceeds, and work a little
less later. Although this is true for any individual, it cannot be true in the aggregate, since
average labor input is pinned down by feasibility at ¯ h1 = x∗
1.
Given this, one can resolve the indeterminacy for individuals in two ways. First, one can focus
on symmetric equilibria where all agents choose the same solution when they have the same set
of solutions to a maximization problem, which seems innocuous since other equilibria are payoﬀ
equivalent and observationally equivalent at the aggregate level; this pins down b2 = ¯ b2 for all
agents. Alternatively, we could impose an arbitrarily small transaction cost on revolving debt
in subperiod 1, which would break agents’ indiﬀerence and reﬁne away any other equilibria. In
what follows we take the former route and focus on symmetric equilibria. Then, aggregating
budget equations across agents, we have
¯ x1 = ¯ h1 + φ1(¯ m1 − ¯ m2) − (1 + r1)¯ b1 +¯ b2. (7)
In equilibrium, ¯ h1 = ¯ x1 = x∗
1, ¯ m1 = ¯ m2 = M, and ¯ b1 = 0. Hence, (7) implies b2 = 0, and no
agents carry debt out of market 1 into market 2; the interesting issues here instead concern debt
acquired in market 2.
2.2 Market 2
At s = 2, a measure π of agents want to consume but cannot produce and a measure π can




2 is the consumption of consumers and hP
2 the production of producers. The expected
value of entering market 2 is therefore
W2(m2,b2) = πWC
2 (m2,b2) + πWP





2 are the value functions for a consumer, a producer and a nontrader.
It is tedious but useful to study their problems one at a time.
For a nontrader,
WN
2 (m2,b2) = max
m3,b3
β2W3(m3,b3)
s.t. 0 = φ2(m2 − m3) − (1 + r2)b2 + b3.
Although nontraders neither consume nor produce, they can adjust their portfolios, but we will
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2b(m2,b2) = −(1 + r2)c′
2(hP
2 ) = (1 + r2)β2W3b(mP
3 ,bP
3 ). (19)
We cannot conclude that (m3,b3) is independent of (m2,b2), the way we could conclude that
(m2,b2) is independent of (m1,b1) in the previous subperiod, since in this market we generally
do not assume u2 and c2 are linear. But in any case,
W2m(m2,b2) = β2[πW3m(mC
3 ,bC
3 ) + πW3m(mP
3 ,bP
3 ) + (1 − 2π)W3m(mN
3 ,bN
3 )] (20)
W2b(m2,b2) = β2(1 + r2)[πW3b(mC
3 ,bC
3 ) + πW3b(mP
3 ,bP




In market 3 we assume trade occurs via anonymous bilateral meetings. Also, we use generalized
Nash bargaining, although this is not crucial – e.g. Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007)
10analyze similar models with other bargaining solutions, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) consider
price taking and price posting, while Kircher and Galenianos (2006) and Dutu, Julien and King
(2007) consider versions with auctions, and the key results go through with these alternative
pricing mechanisms. In any case, in market 3, you cannot use credit, due to anonymity: I will
not take your IOU because I know you could renege without fear of punishment.7 There is still
an issue as to why some institution that is not anonymous does not issue interest-bearing claims
– i.e. private money – that circulate in market 3. One answer is to say that such claims can be
counterfeited (the government has a monopoly on the production of non-counterfeitable notes),
which is a strong assumption but one that is logically consistent and provides a role for both
some form of money and credit.8
Consider a meeting where one agent wants to consume and the other can produce. Call the
former agent the buyer and the latter the seller. They bargain over the amount of consumption
for the buyer x3 and labor by the seller h3, and also a dollar payment d from to the former to
the latter. Since feasibility implies x3 = h3, we denote their common value by q. If (m3,b3) is
the state of a buyer and (˜ m3,˜ b3) the state of a seller, the outcome satisﬁes the generalized Nash
bargaining solution,
(q,d) ∈ argmax S(m3,b3)θ ˜ S(˜ m3,˜ b3)1−θ s.t. d ≤ m3, (22)
where the constraint says an agent cannot give more money than he has, θ is the bargaining
7Anonymity is a logically coherent assumption making money essential, although one need not take it literally
as a description of all monetary trade; as we discuss later, in principle alternative motives for using cash (e.g. tax
avoidance) could work for our purposes.
8As we said above, there are related models where agents deposit money in institutions like banks and pay
with instruments like checks or debit cards in the decentralized market, assuming these are also not too easy to
counterfeit. This works even if individuals are anonymous because the instruments are claims on the bank and
not on the consumer – consider e.g. travellers’ checks. Interest on this private (inside) money is endogenous, but
generally will be less than the market rate on consumer credit for several reasons, including bank operating costs,
legal restrictions, or the need for banks to hold some low-interest assets as reserves. All we need is that rates on
liquid assets like demand deposits are below those on consumer credit.
11power of the buyer, and the surpluses are given by
S(m3,b3) = u3(q) + β3W1,+1(m3 − d,b3) − β3W1,+1(m3,b3)
˜ S(˜ m3,˜ b3) = −c3(q) + β3W1,+1(˜ m3 + d,˜ b3) − β3W1,+1(˜ m3,˜ b3).
Using (5) and (6), we have the neat simpliﬁcation
S(m3,b3) = u3(q) − β3φ1,+1d
˜ S(˜ m3,˜ b3) = −c3(q) + β3φ1,+1d.
This yields the following generalization of LW (a proof is in the Appendix).
Lemma 1. ∀(m3,b3) and (˜ m3,˜ b3), the solution to the bargaining problem is
q =
￿
g−1(β3m3φ1,+1) if m3 < m∗
3




m3 if m3 < m∗
3
m∗
3 if m3 ≥ m∗
3
(23)
where q∗ solves u′
3(q∗) = c′
3(q∗), the function g( ) is given by
g(q) ≡
θu′
3(q)c3(q) + (1 − θ)u3(q)c′
3(q)
θu′





Observe that the bargaining solution (q,d) depends on the buyer’s money holdings m3 and not
on any other element of (m3,b3) or (˜ m3,˜ b3); hence we write q = q(m3) and d = d(m3) from now
on. We also show in the Appendix, as in LW, that m3 < m∗
3 in any equilibrium. Hence, buyers
always spend all their money in market 3, d(m3) = m3, and receive q = g−1(β3m3φ1,+1) < q∗
in return, which yields ∂q/∂m3 = β3φ1,+1/g′(q) > 0.
Let σ be the probability of a meeting between a buyer and seller in market 3. Then
W3(m3,b3) = σ {u3[q(m3)]+β3W1[m3 − d(m3),b3]}
+ σE{−c3[q(˜ m3)]+β3W1[m3 + d(˜ m3),b3]} + (1 − 2σ)β3W1[m3,b3], (25)
12where E is the expectation of ˜ m3 (the money holdings of a random agent one meets, which in
equilibrium is actually degenerate at ˜ m3 = M). Diﬀerentiating (25) using (5) and (6),
W3m(m3,b3) = β3φ1,+1 {σe[q(m3)] + 1 − σ} (26)
W3b(m3,b3) = −β3(1 + r1,+1), (27)
where the function e( ) in (26) is given by
e(q) ≡ u′
3(q)/g′(q), (28)
with g(q) deﬁned in (24). We assume e′(q) < 0; suﬃcient conditions for this can be found in
LW.9
3 Equilibrium
Our deﬁnition of equilibrium is relatively standard, except there is no market-clearing condition
for market 3, since with bilateral trade it clears automatically. Also, to reduce notation, we
describe every agent’s problem at s = 1,2 in terms of choosing (xs,hs,ms+1,bs+1), which are
implicitly functions of the state, and it is understood that for producers xP
2 = 0, for consumers
hC
2 = 0, and for nontraders xN
2 = hN
2 = 0.10
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium is a set of (possibly time-dependent) value functions {Ws},
s = 1,2,3, decision rules {xs,hs,ms+1,bs+1}, s = 1,2, bargaining outcomes {q,d}, and prices
{rs,φs}, s = 1,2, such that:
9A simple assumption that works for any preferences is θ ≈ 1, since θ = 1 implies g(q) = c(q). But even if we
do not have e
′(q) < 0 for all q, it is easy to check that e
′(q) < 0 for any q that satisﬁes the second order conditions
to the maximization problem in market 2, so this assumption is really not much of a restriction.
10We do not include the distribution of the state variable in the deﬁnition of equilibrium, but it is implicit:
given an initial distribution F1(m,b) at the start of subperiod 1, the decision rules generate F2(m,b); then the
decision rules at s = 2 generate F3(m,b); and the bargaining outcome at s = 3 generates F1,+1(m,b). Also, as we
said above, we only consider equilibria where we have an interior solution for h.
131. Optimization: In every period, for every agent, {Ws}, s = 1,2,3, solve the Bellman equa-
tions (1), (8) and (25); {xs,hs,ms+1,bs+1}, s = 1,2, solve the relevant maximization
problems; and {q,d} solve the bargaining problem.
2. Market clearing: In every period,
¯ xs = ¯ hs, ¯ ms+1 = M, ¯ bs+1 = 0, s = 1,2
where for any variable y, ¯ y =
R
yidi denotes the aggregate.
Deﬁnition 2. A steady state equilibrium is an equilibrium where the endogenous variables are
constant across periods, although generally not across subperiods within a period.
We are mainly interested in equilibria where money is valued, which means it must be valued
in all subperiods in every period.
Deﬁnition 3. A monetary equilibrium is an equilibrium where, in every period, φs > 0, s = 1,2,
and q > 0.
Theorem 1. There exists a steady state monetary equilibrium, and it is characterized by:
1. At s = 1, all agents choose the same consumption x1 = x∗
1, portfolio (m2,b2) = (M,0),
and as a function of their individual states (m1,b1) hours
h1 = h1(m1,b1) = x∗
1 − φ1(m1 − M) + (1 + r1)b1,
which implies that on average h1 is ¯ h1 = x∗
1.
2. At s = 2,
consumers choose x2 = x∗
2, m3 = M and b3 = x∗
2;
producers choose h2 = x∗
2, m3 = M and b3 = −x∗
2;
nontraders choose m3 = M and b3 = 0.





where e(q) is given by (28) and ρ is deﬁned by
1
1 + ρ
= β1β2β3, which implies q < q∗.













, and φ2 =
φ1 [σe(q) + 1 − σ]
1 + r1
.
Proof: To begin, insert the envelope condition for W3b from (27) into (13) and (17) to get
u′
2(xC
2 ) = β2β3(1 + r1,+1) (30)
c′
2(hP
2 ) = β2β3(1 + r1,+1). (31)
This implies u′
2(xC
2 ) = c′
2(hP
2 ), and hence xC
2 = hP
2 = x∗
2. Similarly, insert the envelope condition
for W3m from (26) into the ﬁrst order conditions (12) and (16) to get
φ2u′
2(xC



















+ 1 − σ
￿
. (33)




2, we conclude mC
3 = mP
3 .








+ 1 − σ
￿
= φ2(1 + r1,+1). (34)
Exactly the same condition results from combining (30) and (32) for a consumer, or (31) and
(33) for a producer. Hence, we conclude mN
3 = mC
3 = mP
3 = M. From the budget equations,
bC
3 = x∗
2 + (1 + r2)b2
bP
3 = −x∗
2 + (1 + r2)b2
bN
3 = (1 + r2)b2.
15This completes the description of market 2. Moving back to market 1, clearly (2) implies
x1 = x∗
1. Inserting the envelope conditions for W2 and W3 into (3) and (4), we have
φ1 = β1β2β3φ1,+1{σe[q(M)] + 1 − σ} (35)
1 = β1β2β3(1 + r2)(1 + r1,+1), (36)
where we use in the ﬁrst case the result that W3m depends on m3 but not b3, and m3 = M. Notice
(36) is an arbitrage condition between r2 and r1,+1: if it does not hold there is no solution to the
agents’ problem at s = 1; and if it does hold then any choice of b2 is consistent with optimization.




= σe[q(M)] + 1 − σ. (37)
In steady state this implies (29). It is now standard (see LW) to show q < q∗.
This pins down the allocation. Now consider prices. We get r1 from (30) with x2 = x∗
2, and
then set r2 in terms of r1 to satisfy the arbitrage condition (36). Given q, Lemma 1 tells us φ1,
and (34) tells us φ2, as described in the statement of the Theorem. This is all we need for the
deﬁnition of equilibrium (plus the value functions, but these are obvious). By construction, this
constitutes a steady state monetary equilibrium. ￿
Theorem 2. (Rate of Return Dominance) In any steady state monetary equilibrium,
φ1,+1
φ2






1 − σ + σe(q)
.
The result follows if e(q) > 1. By (29), in steady state e(q) = 1 + ρ/σ > 1. ￿
164 Discussion
Here we make several remarks concerning the above Theorems and argue that they are robust
to a variety of extensions. We also discuss their economic content and empirical implications.
To begin, the central result of Theorem 1 is that, at s = 2, consumers use credit (b3 = x∗
2)
even though they have cash on hand (m2 = m3 > 0). The reason is that they know they may
need the money at s = 3, when credit is not available. Notice also that the proof not only
characterizes equilibrium and establishes existence, basically by construction, it also establishes
that the steady state is unique, which is important for the following reason: we not only can
claim that there is some steady state equilibrium where consumers with cash choose to use
credit, we can also claim that this must happen, since this equilibrium is unique.11 Theorem 2
goes on to say that agents with cash choose to use credit despite rate of return dominance – i.e.
despite credit being costly in terms of interest payments.
To see this more clearly, note that (34) equates the value of a dollar’s worth of cash and a
dollar’s worth of credit/debt coming out of market 2. The left side is a weighted average of the
marginal gain if the dollar is spent in market 3, u′(q)q′(m3) = β3φ1,+1e(q), and the return if it is
not spent but carried forward to the next period, β3φ1,+1. The right side is the real return (the
interest saved) from using the same dollar to pay down debt, β3φ2(1+r1,+1). A key observation
is that the return on money includes a liquidity premium: since e(q) > 1 in equilibrium, the
value of spending a dollar at s = 3 is higher than the value of carrying it to next period. If one
ignores this premium, and simply considers the return on carrying money across periods, then
it looks like – indeed it is – rate of return dominance. Of course, there is a liquidity premium in
11Recall is the above-mentioned caveat concerning uniqueness: we impose in market 1 that all agents choose
the same solution for b2 when they have multiple solutions. As we said, other equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent
and observationally equivalent in the aggregate, so this is not much of a restriction. In any other equilibrium,
prices and consumption are actually exactly as stated in Theorem 1, but individuals may choose to roll over debt
between periods, which aﬀects the timing of their labor supply but does not not any of the results concerning
money and credit.
17other monetary models, including LW; the big diﬀerence here is that agents make real choices
to use money or credit, and both are essential in the sense that the economy is worse oﬀ if we
arbitrarily shut down either one.12
4.1 Theoretical Extensions
Here we consider several technical extensions, and show the economic content is robust. First
note that in any equilibrium, and not just in steady state, essentially everything in Theorems 1
and 2 holds, except that (37) does not reduce to (29). Instead, we can insert g(q) = β3m3φ1,+1




= σe(q+1) + 1 − σ. (38)
Monetary equilibria are given by (positive) bounded paths {qt} solving (38), along with values
for the other objects satisfying the conditions above. As in most monetary models, there are
multiple equilibrium paths {qt}, including exotic dynamic and sunspot equilibria (Lagos and
Wright 2003), but in all of these equilibria xs, bs, and rs are exactly as in Theorem 1, and
although φs will change over time, Theorem 2 holds as stated.
Another generalization is to allow the money supply to vary over time. Suppose e.g. M+1 =
(1+γ)M, with money being injected or withdrawn in market 1 via lump sum transfers or taxes.
Consider equilibria where all real variables, including q and φM, are stationary, which means
φ1/φ1,+1 = 1+γ and (37) becomes (1+ρ)(1+γ) = σe[q(M)]+1−σ. From the Fisher equation,
12We mention some technical details here. First, one can always price in the model a nominal bond traded
in s = 2 at t and redeemed in s = 1 at t + 1 using the Fisher equation, which yields the nominal interest rate
1 + i1,+1 = (1 + r1,+1)φ2/φ1,+1 (for the sake of this discussion, assume these bonds are illiquid – they cannot be
used as a medium of exchange in market 3, either because they are not tangible objects but merely book-keeping
entries, say, or because they are counterfeitable in that market). Then Theorem 2 can be equivalently stated as
i1,+1 > 0. The nominal rate is the opportunity cost of carrying cash, which agents are willing to pay, for the
beneﬁt of liquidity. Also, the results above are framed in terms of rates of return between s = 2 at t and s = 1 at
t+1, because it is at s = 2 that the decision is made to pay with cash or credit, but we can alternatively measure
returns over the entire period. From s = 1 at t to s = 1 at t + 1, the gross return on money in steady state is 1,
while the return on credit (paying down debt) is (1 + r2)(1 + r1,+1). We readily get (1 + r2)(1 + r1,+1) > 1 from
(36), so rate of return dominance also holds across the entire period.





Thus, q is decreasing in i, but this does not aﬀect the real allocation in markets 1 and 2. As is
standard, the Friedman rule i = 0 is achieved by a policy setting γ = β1β2β3 − 1, and provides
a lower bound on γ. At the Friedman rule, the returns on money and credit are the same; for
any other feasible policy, we still get rate of return dominance.13
Next, note that although the baseline 3-subperiod model has some agents carrying debt and
money simultaneously, they never need to roll over this debt for more than a period – they could
roll it over, but as long as they have to pay it oﬀ sometime, given quasi-linear utility at s = 1
this is as good a time as any. Of course, this does not mean the model speaks only to high-
frequency observations, since we can make a period as long as we like (indeed, in an overlapping
generations version, we could make it a lifetime). However, if one wants debt rollover to be more
complicated, we can extend this version of the model to have n subperiods. For this exercise we
will let the centralized and decentralized markets be open simultaneously each subperiod, and
have agents transit between them as follows: those in the centralized market at s move to the
decentralized market at s + 1 with probability δs; and those in the decentralized market at s
move to the centralized market at s + 1 with probability 1.14
As long as δs > 0, agents are willing to pay an opportunity cost of carrying money at s, since
they might need it at s+1. For convenience, set δn = 0, so everyone is in the centralized market
at s = 1, and let them all produce and have quasi-utility linear at s = 1, so they settle all their
debts at s = 1, as in the benchmark model. In each s ∈ {2,...,n}, the centralized markets are
13Since this is a paper on positive and not normative economics, we take the policy i as exogenous and do not
ask why it is what it is. It is of course optimal here to set i = 0, for all the usual reasons, plus one: we simply
assume the enforcement of credit is feasible in centralized markets, but in reality, as a referee pointed out, even
if it is feasible it need not be free. At the Friedman rule i = 0 agents are happy to use money for all trades, and
we can save any costs associated with credit.
14The convenient aspect of this speciﬁcation, adapted from Williamson (2005), is that one is never in a
decentralized market two periods in a row, as in our baseline model.
19like market 2 in the benchmark, except now we can more generally let productivity ωs diﬀer
across agents and subperiods in any i.i.d. manner (ωs = 0 is the case where you cannot produce
at all). Also, let agents in the centralized markets at s > 1 now have general utility functions
Us(xs,hs). In the decentralized markets, agents trade bilaterally, exactly as in market 3 in the
benchmark model.
In the working paper (Telyukova and Wright 2006) we establish the following generalizations
of Theorems 1 and 2 for the model with n subperiods:
Theorem 3. There exists a steady state monetary equilibrium and it implies:
1. For all s, every agent leaves the centralized market with the same ms+1 = M.
2. For all s, Usx(xs,hs) = ks and Ush(xs,hs) = −ksωs where ks is constant across agents in
the centralized market.
3. If two agents have diﬀerent (ms,bs) and the same productivity ωs, their hs, xs and ms+1
are the same, so they have diﬀerent bs+1; if two agents have the same (ms,bs) and diﬀerent
ωs, their hs will diﬀer and they typically have diﬀerent bs+1.
4. Agents may roll over or run up debt between s = 2 and s = n while maintaining their
holdings of ms.
Theorem 4. In monetary equilibrium, for all s  = n,
φ1,+1
φs
< (1 + rs+1)(1 + rs+2)...(1 + rn)(1 + r1,+1). (40)
Hence the general framework easily accommodates many trading rounds between times when
agents settle, and they sometimes roll over and even run up debt for several rounds, at positive
interest rates, while holding money. Given this is clear, for simplicity we revert to the baseline
model with 3 markets from now on.
20A referee suggested the next generalization: in market 3, in addition to having a probability
σ of an anonymous meeting where you cannot use credit, there is a probability ˜ σ of a nonanony-
mous meeting where you can. One can interpret this in terms of preference shocks: sometimes
you want a good produced by someone who knows you, so you do not need cash; other times
you want a good produced by someone who does not, so you need cash. It is easy to prove that
in nonanonymous meetings, where credit is feasible, agents trade the eﬃcient quantity q = q∗,
and are indiﬀerent between payments in any combination of cash and credit with the same value
(although they must use some credit since m3 is never enough in equilibrium to aﬀord q∗). The
value of q in anonymous meetings satisﬁes (29), as before, which depends on σ but not on ˜ σ.
When σ → 0, which must happen when ˜ σ → 1, money becomes worthless; but for any ˜ σ < 1,
as long as we have σ > 0 all our results go through.
The next theoretical extension was inspired by another referee, who was concerned that
although the baseline model may account for the observation that consumers choose not to pay
down debt when they have cash on hand, it could not account for the observation that they
also hold other assets, that are less liquid than cash and have rates of return that are positive
but lower than those on debt. To address this, we now suppose there is another asset a, in
addition to m and b.15 For concreteness, suppose it is a standard “Lucas tree” in ﬁxed supply
A that pays a real dividend δ each period at s = 1, and can be traded at price ψs at s = 1,2.
It can also be used as a means of payment at s = 3, but only if one pays a ﬁxed cost p in terms
of utility (it would be easy to also make it in terms of money). This is meant to capture the
“penalty for early withdrawal” on some time deposits, the ﬁxed cost involved in taking out a
second mortgage or home equity loan, and so on. Thus, a is less liquid than m, but it can be
accessed if necessary.
15This is related to recent work by Lagos (2006), Lagos and Rocheteau (2006), and Geromichalos, Licari and
Su´ arez-Lled´ o (2006) on search models with multiple assets, but the important additional assumption, for our
purposes, is that we introduce a ﬁxed cost to liquidating one of them.
21The market 1 problem is now
W1(m1,b1,a1) = max
x1,h1,m2,b2,a2
{u1(x1) − h1 + β1W2(m2,b2,a2)}
s.t. x1 = h1 + φ1(m1 − m2) − b1(1 + r1) + b2 + a1(ψ1 + δ) − ψ1a2
We get the same ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions (2)-(6) as above, plus obvious new conditions
concerning a3. The results go through about everyone choosing the same portfolio (m2,b2,a2) =
(M,0,A), and W being linear. At s = 2, we have the ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions from
the baseline model plus the obvious conditions concerning a3. At s = 3, agents meet and bargain
over q and payments dm and da in terms of m and a, taking into account that the buyer has to
pay liquidation cost p(da), with p(da) = p > 0 if da > 0 and p(0) = 0.
For simplicity, at s = 3 we assume θ = 1 (take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by buyers) and c(q) = q.
The key assumption is that a buyer’s preferences are random: with probability σ he has a regular
meeting with utility u3(q); with probability ˆ σ he has an emergency meeting with ˆ u3(ˆ q), where
ˆ u′
3(q) > u′
3(q) for all q. With θ = 1, in a regular meeting the buyer chooses (q,dm,da) to solve
max
q,dm,da
{u3(q) − β3[φ1,+1dm + (ψ1,+1 + δ)da] − p(da)}
s.t. q = β3[φ1,+1dm + (ψ1,+1 + δ)da], dm ≤ m3, da ≤ a3;
and in an emergency meeting he chooses (ˆ q, ˆ dm, ˆ da) to solve an analogous problem. The usual
reasoning leads to
W3(m3,b3,a3) = σ{u3(q) − p(da) + β3W1(m3 − dm,b3,a3 − da)}
+ˆ σ{ˆ u3(ˆ q) − p(ˆ da) + β3W1(m3 − ˆ dm,b3,a3 − ˆ da)}
+(1 − σ − ˆ σ)β3W1(m3,b3,a3).
We look for an equilibrium where dm = ˆ dm = m3, while da = 0 and ˆ da > 0 – i.e., buyers
regularly spend all of m but do not touch a, and they liquidate a just in cases of emergency.
22It should be clear that we can always pick the liquidation cost p so that we get da = 0 and
ˆ da > 0. As always, we have q < q∗. One can also show now that we can either have ˆ q < ˆ q∗ or
ˆ q = ˆ q∗ depending on whether the asset supply A is below or above some cutoﬀ value (see the
method in Geromichalos et al. 2006). Let us assume A is low, so that ˆ da = a3 and ˆ q < ˆ q∗ (when
you liquidate you spend all your a holdings, but even this is not enough to get ˆ q∗). After some
algebra, we have
W3b(m3,b3,a3) = −β3(1 + r1,+1)
W3a(m3,b3,a3) = β3(ψ1,+1 + δ)[ˆ σˆ u′
3(ˆ q) + 1 − ˆ σ]
W3m(m3,b3,a3) = β3φ1,+1[σu′
3(q) + ˆ σˆ u′
3(ˆ q) + 1 − σ − ˆ σ].
Given this, one can compute the rates of return on the assets as follows:
1 + ib = (1 + r1)(1 + r2) = 1 + ρ






3(ˆ q) + 1 − ˆ σ






3(q) + ˆ σˆ u′
3(ˆ q) + 1 − σ − ˆ σ
This yields generalized rate of return dominance: ib > ia > im. The reason is of course that
b has no liquidity premium, m has a high liquidity premium, and a is somewhere in between.
Consumers at s = 2 do not pay down debt even though they hold both m and a. They do not
pay down debt with m at s = 2 because they know that with some probability they will ﬁnd
themselves in a situation at s = 3 where they want to consume, credit is not available, and a little
bit of cash gets them by. They do not pay down debt with a at s = 2 because they know there
is some probability they need a lot of money, and they value the fact that they can liquidate a
in an emergency, as long as they pay the ﬁxed cost p. So, as this three-asset extension makes
clear, the fact that agents have high-interest debt while holding not only low-interest cash, but
also other medium-interest assets, is not a problem in principle for liquidity-based theory.
234.2 Empirical Issues
Here we brieﬂy comment on several empirical issues. First, recall the following: if one looks at
the population in 2001 and considers those holding more than $500 in liquid assets and more
than $500 in credit card debt, which Telyukova (2006) calls the puzzle group, they constitute
27% of the population. Gross and Souleles (2001) deﬁned the puzzle group diﬀerently. First,
they consider everyone who revolves some debt and holds any positive amount of liquidity,
which in their 1995 data amounts to around 34% of the population. But they clearly recognize
that people might need to keep some money on hand for transaction purposes, and attempt
to control for this. To account for some liquidity demand they allow households to hold one
month’s income in liquid assets before counting them in their puzzle group, reducing its size to
11%. It is this 11% that they say cannot be explained with a transaction-based story.
The ﬁrst thing to point out is that although Gross and Souleles suggest that allowing agents
to hold one month’s income in liquid assets is “arguably generous,” one could also say it is
“completely arbitrary.” Why is a month’s income the right number? Telyukova (2006) ﬁnds in
the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey that the median household in her puzzle group, with
$3,800 in credit card debt and $3,000 in the bank, purchased goods worth $1,993 per month
using liquid assets, amounting to around two-thirds of their monthly income. So one month’s
income allows for very little precautionary liquidity demand. As we said, precautionary demand
can emerge from the possibility of shocks involving home or auto repairs, medical emergencies,
etc., and it is not so much that these shocks necessarily happen often – although they might –
but that they can be very costly when one is not ﬁnancially prepared. Hence, it is by no means
a foregone conclusion that the 11% puzzle group identiﬁed by Gross and Souleles could not be
holding liquidity for precautionary reasons.16
16Income shocks also aﬀect precautionary demand: even if expenses like mortgage payments are predictable,
in case of a fall in income opportunities, you better have a little something in the bank to make the payments.
24We adopt a broader notion of the puzzle group, amounting to 27% of the population, and take
the position that the behavior of all these agents would be hard to understand based on simple
economic theory, but not so hard based on a theory incorporating liquidity. Therefore liquidity-
based models are useful. Now it is obviously diﬃcult to measure exactly how much people
desire liquidity based on actual expenditures out of liquid assets (unless they are completely
risk neutral, which is not a very attractive assumption). The more liquidity matters, the more
we can explain using a liquidity-based approach. Allowing it to matter less and focusing on a
smaller puzzle group, as in Gross and Souleles, makes the phenomenon harder to explain but
perhaps also diminishes its importance – would we worry if one individual in the data had an
especially bizarre asset position? We are happy thinking there is a large group that is easier to
understand once we introduce liquidity, even if there are some people we do not explain based
on this approach.
From this perspective, one could ask how much we can explain, rather than if we explain
everything. This is a fairly complicated quantitative question, and as such a serious attempt to
answer it belongs in a diﬀerent paper. But we can summarize some of the ﬁndings in Telyukova
(2006), who calibrates a model in the same spirit as the one developed here, although she relaxes
some of the assumptions, and introduces some others.17 As compared to the data, her calibrated
model generates almost but not quite as many households simultaneously holding credit card
debt and liquid assets – i.e. the size of the puzzle group is about right. And for these households,
the model easily accounts for at least half of their liquid assets. So liquidity-based explanation
appears quantitatively relevant; one could say that it looks to be a sizable part of the puzzle,
if not the whole story. If there is something left to be explained, that is interesting, and opens
the door for other explanations to play some role – we do not insist that there is necessarily one
17Her speciﬁcation is more general in the sense that it departs from quasi-linear utility, which may be quanti-
tatively relevant and generates more interesting debt rollover, but since this complicates the analysis considerably
she has to make sacriﬁces on other dimensions (e.g. interest rates are exogenous).
25deﬁnitive explanation that works to the exclusion of all others.
Still, it is worth thinking about ways to discriminate between stories. Based on a cursory
reading of Gross and Souleles and the analysis in this paper up to but not including the extensions
in Section 4.1, one might think that a liquidity-based approach could be dismissed as follows.
Our baseline model predicts agents may have debt and cash on hand, but they would never
hold other assets with interest rates that are positive but less than those on debt, as in the data
some people do. The puzzle is not just why agents with credit card debt hold cash, we also have
to explain why they do not draw down other wealth, like home equity or retirement accounts.
While our baseline model cannot explain this, the extension with three assets and a ﬁxed cost
generates exactly m,a,b > 0 with im < ia < ib. So one cannot rule out liquidity-based stories
as easily as that. What is true is that the theory requires low-return assets to be more liquid
than high-return assets. To the extent that liquidity can be measured, this is testable.
Recall that some alternative potential explanations of the credit card debt puzzle were men-
tioned in the Introduction. One candidate is that people roll over credit card debt to control
spending by their spouses (Bertaut and Haliassos 2002; Haliassos and Reiter 2003). A problem
with this theory, in addition to the fact that it is a fairly expensive way to keep one’s house
in order, is that single and married people do not behave very diﬀerently in the data in terms
of holding signiﬁcant debt and liquidity; see Telyukova (2006). So this idea obviously cannot
be the biggest piece of the puzzle. Another candidate explanation is that people in the puzzle
group are on the verge of bankruptcy (Lehnert and Maki 2001). Problems with this include the
fact that these people actually do not go bankrupt with particularly high probability, and the
fact that they often have sizeable wealth in other assets; again see Telyukova (2006). So, while
this may also be a piece of the puzzle, it cannot be a large part.
There are other candidate explanations. As a referee put it, “The obvious alternative is
26that the puzzle is due to a failure of optimal portfolio choice or no-arbitrage conditions for
whatever reason.” This is not exactly what we would call a competing theory – it is more of
a non-theory, although approaches like the one in Laibson et al. (2000) might help make it
less imprecise – but we have to admit it may be true. At some level, of course, it must be
true: no one takes economic theory literally. The pertinent questions are, how well can we
do understanding a relatively large fraction of households with our economic models? And do
these models match up reasonably well with other aspects of the data? The same referee made
several excellent suggestions concerning ways to think about this, and while clearly an in-depth
empirical analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper, we can discuss some of the issues brieﬂy.
A big component of our overall view is that there are unexpected shocks that require liquid
assets. This apparently suggests those who are more likely to experience such shocks ought to
hold more liquidity. For instance, home owners, car owners, and possibly those in poor health, at
least to the extent that they are not fully insured, ought to hold more liquidity, other things being
equal. Deﬁning the puzzle group as those with over $500 in both debt and liquid assets, the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finance indicates that 30% of homeowners and 22% of non-homeowners
are in this category.18 Also, renters are twice as likely as homeowners to hold less than $500
in liquid assets, and the average monthly liquidity of a median renter is $1,000 while for a
mortgage-paying homeowner it is about $4,000, amounting to 94% and 44% of monthly income,
respectively (these numbers are for all households, not only the puzzle group). It appears that
homeowners do hold greater liquidity, consistent with our theory.
In terms of automobiles, 28% of car owners are in the puzzle group, as compared to only 21%
of non-car owners, also consistent with our theory. There is a monotone relationship between the
18To go into slightly more detail, 32% of homeowners who are paying a mortgage are in the puzzle group,
as compared to 22% of those who are no longer paying a mortgage and 22% of renters. This suggests that the
commitment to mortgage is the important factor. Of course, it may also suggest that richer people, who have
paid oﬀ their mortgages, are more able to repay credit card debt: 75% of them have no debt, versus 63% among
those with mortgages.
27number of cars a household owns and the likelihood of being in the puzzle group, although it is
not strong (29% of those who have three cars are in the group, versus 27% of those who only have
one car). There does not appear to be a systematic relationship between the age of the cars a
household owns and the likelihood of being in the puzzle group: those whose car is from 1990 are
about as likely to be in the group as those whose car is a 2002 model in 2001. However, perhaps
this is because both predicted and precautionary needs play a role for automobile owners, since
those with newer cars are often making payments while those with older cars are done with
payments but need more liquidity due to a higher probability of non-warrantied repairs.
The results from a quick look at the health data are less clear, but this is perhaps due
to the fact that some health expenditures can be paid by credit card or ﬁnanced through the
hospital directly. In any case, the fractions in the puzzle group are 28%, 28% and 22% for
those respectively reporting good, average and poor health status. What is more striking, if not
surprising, is that bad health prevents people from holding on to liquidity at all: 4% of those in
good health, 8% of those in average health, and 11% of those in bad health hold less than $500
in liquid assets. In terms of health insurance, 12% of those without insurance, and 4% of those
with insurance, report less than $500 in liquid assets. Of course, these observations may be due
a variety of other factors, and in general we think that confronting the theory with the health
data demands more time than we have available in this brief discussion.
Another issue we want to mention is this: a naive observer might dismiss our approach all
too quickly based on the fact that one can often get cash advances on credit cards, which means
that even if a purchase cannot be made on credit one need not have cash in hand. This argument
neglects the fact that cash advances usually have strict limits and typically involve very high
interest charges (much higher than interest on purchases). A good question is, why are interest
rates so high for cash advances? We do not know, for sure, but oﬀer a conjecture. Credit card
28companies want agents to hold liquid assets, rather than use them to pay down debt, since after
all revolving debt is how they make most of their proﬁt. By making cash advances costly, credit
card companies increase the demand for liquidity, keep people from paying down debt, and in
this way increase proﬁt. Careful analysis of this idea, like all those in this subsection, must be
relegated to other work.
Two ﬁnal issues come to mind. First, although the formal model here is based on anonymity
in some trading opportunities, this is not really central to the general idea and is not meant to
be taken literally. Other motives for sellers not extending credit – including e.g. tax motives –
could in principle replace anonymity between buyers and sellers. It would therefore be a mistake
to reject the story of home repairs often requiring cash just because in reality the plumber knows
your name and where you live, since there may be another issue of anonymity concerning him
and Uncle Sam. Second, although our analysis predicts agents with cash may use debt even
though it entails interest charges, we do not say much about just how high that interest should
be. If one wants a model of the actual magnitudes of credit card interest, one should probably
incorporate several features not in our setting, perhaps especially default risk. Although it would
be interesting to do so, default would certainly clutter the analysis, and does not seem central
to our question.19
5 Conclusion
The coexistence of assets with diﬀerent returns has recently been dubbed the credit card debt
puzzle. We pointed out that this is actually a special case of the rate of return dominance
puzzle. We extended recent developments in monetary theory to construct a model where
agents sometimes have the option to trade using credit and sometimes do not. The framework
19Recent papers that study this aspect of the market include Chatterjee, Corbae and Rios-Rull (2007) and
Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2007); previous work includes Ausubel. (1991, 1999).
29is tractable, and yields strong predictions. One prediction is that agents use credit even if it is
costly in terms of interest and they have liquid assets at hand. The intuition for this is that they
know they may need the liquidity later, when credit may not be available. One might say this
is reasonable, perhaps even obvious; this does not mean it is incorrect or uninteresting. Aside
from the particular application to credit card debt, the formal framework here is also novel, and
as there are not many tractable models with a role for both money and credit, we think the
approach may ﬁnd many other applications.
30Appendix
First we derive the bargaining solution in Lemma 1. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
(22) are
θ[β3φ1,+1d − c3 (q)]u′
3 (q) = (1 − θ)[u3 (q) − β3φ1,+1d]c′
3 (q) (41)
θ[β3φ1,+1d − c3 (q)]β3φ1,+1 = (1 − θ)[u3 (q) − β3φ1,+1d]β3φ1,+1 (42)
−λ[u3 (q) − β3φ1,+1d]
1−θ [β3φ1,+1d − c3 (q)]
θ
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on d ≤ m3. There are two possible cases: If the constraint
does not bind, then λ = 0, q = q∗ and d = m∗. If the constraint binds then q is given by (41)
with d = m3, as claimed.
We now argue that m3 < m∗
3. First, as is standard, in any equilibrium φ1,+1 ≤ (1 + ρ)φ1
(the nominal interest rate i is nonnegative). In fact, again as is standard, although we allow
i → 0, we assume i > 0, so that φ1,+1 < (1+ρ)φ1. Now suppose m3 > m∗
3 at some date for some
agent. Since the bargaining solution tells us he never spends more than m∗
3, he could reduce m3
by reducing h1 at t, then increase h1 at t + 1 and not change anything else. It is easy to check
that this increases utility, so m3 > m∗
3 cannot occur in equilibrium. Hence m3 ≤ m∗
3. To show
strict inequality, suppose m3 = m∗
3 for same agent. Again he can reduce h1 at t and carry less
money. If he is a buyer in subperiod 3, he gets a smaller q, but the continuation value is the
same since by the bargaining solution he still spends all his money. If he does not buy then he
can increase h1 at t + 1 so that he need not change anything else. It is easy to check that the
net gain from carrying less money is positive, as in LW.
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